Review of A neuroscientific model of near-death experiences DE CHARLOTTE MARTIAL ET AL
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41582-025-01072-z
Xavier Melo
As those who follow the scientific literature on Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) know, Charlotte Martial and her team propose a naturalistic model based on a main assertion: all human experiences are produced by the brain.
Faced with the clear challenge that NDEs pose to this principle, Martial and her team can only suggest that such experiences occur in the brief seconds following a cardiorespiratory arrest, not when the brain stops functioning.
In this new article published in Nature, the team’s work is a continued effort to uphold this principle: that all experiences are produced by the brain. To support this, the article combines studies, mostly from Martial’s own team, with ketamine, DMT, electrical spikes in the electroencephalogram (EEG) before death, fainting, REM intrusions, and the secretion of certain neurotransmitters, along with the claim that the brain can “disconnect” from the environment while providing a hyperreal experience.
While each of these studies presents problems, as previously discussed in other entries, Martial suggests that her overall view provides a “robust basis” to neuroscientifically explain NDEs.
Certainly, this assertion comes with a cost: each of these brain states occurs in ordinary consciousness without generating an NDE. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that the NDE occurs in their absence, that is, when the brain is not in any of these states. However, developing this “robust basis” is not as simple as we will see in the detailed analysis of the article.
On the first page, the authors acknowledge that NDEs can occur in situations where life is not threatened, but they suggest that they are a product of a defense mechanism of the brain. The vague concept of “disconnected” is proposed for an activated brain state without connection to the outside world. This idea is only referenced by one of the authors, and since it asserts that human experience comes from the brain, the article, in a way, becomes trivial. Lastly, an ad hoc validation scale is proposed by the authors themselves.
On page 2, events that occur in the brain during the first seconds after a cardiac arrest are discussed as possible explanatory elements of NDEs. However, it is not explained how this can happen without a cardiac arrest or under anesthesia. Neurophysiological models are outlined, jumping from correlations to explanations without anything to support this shift. The article acknowledges the lack of evolutionary value of NDEs, but does not address how this might impact neuroscience. The dualism is adequately explained, but it is falsely asserted that it does not have a “robust” basis.
On page 3, the chronological line of NDE studies grossly excludes all research whose conclusions support a dualistic basis. Additionally, a series of studies involving transcranial stimulation and drug experimentation, often from Martial’s team, are cited, claiming to imitate NDEs. However, neither Blanke’s nor Timmerman’s studies, nor their own, replicate OBEs (Out-of-Body Experiences) or NDEs as shown in previous discussions.
On page 6, endorphins are proposed as causing the well-being or euphoria during an NDE, but it is overlooked that these states disappear once the NDE ends, even though the endorphins remain in the brain. It is also suggested that a tendency among coma survivors to gather illusory memories could explain the hyperreality of NDEs. However, it is not studied whether those with NDEs lacking this feature have less “hyperreal” experiences.
On the next page, the article hypothesizes that the previously explained brain mechanisms could cause figures such as hyperreality, lights, OBEs, etc., but no tests are provided to confirm these hypotheses. Studies by Parnia and others providing verifiable content are dismissed as unreliable.
On page 8, REM intrusions are proposed as explanatory despite the significant phenomenological differences. Theta and delta brain waves, recorded in different states incompatible with lucid consciousness, are interpreted here as potential causes of NDEs.
On the following page (page 9), it is appropriately stated that brain activity ceases within seconds of a cardiac arrest, but this does not seem to pose a threat to their model.
In conclusion, all these “maybes,” “coulds,” and “perhaps” magically transform into a robust model in the conclusions—confusing, incomprehensible, and nonsensical. It is a crude attempt to maintain a position without scientific rigor, promoting the validation of serious hypotheses.
Martial’s article reiterates a common prerogative of naturalistic models: within the 20 seconds after a cardiac arrest, NDEs must occur, so whatever happens to the brain during that time is considered a post hoc explanation. As Radin warned, these models tend to ignore phenomena that don’t fit within this prerogative, such as announced healings, experiences at the Darién Gap, verified events during arrest in different populations—including the blind, children, verified remote events, lucid consciousness under anesthesia, memories formed under hypoxia or vision in blind-born individuals, encounters with deceased relatives at the moment of arrest, and others.
Martial and her team have sufficient academic standing to mention some of these phenomena, but they dismiss them outright. Paradoxically, they request a “robust basis” for a series of conjectures that are either non-traversable in scientific research or have already been entirely discredited. These are the last gasps of maintaining a position that is unreasonable, unscientific, and unsustainable because it simply does not account for reality.
